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We study how poor quality of institution, such as corruption in public procurement 
auction, could hurt welfare. We show how competition effect could improve the 
cost-efficiency but not the quality of a public procurement auction with corruption. In fact, 
no incentive mechanism can be efficient in this auction if qualities are non-contractible. An 
empirical study suggests that increasing the number of bidders does increase the percentage 
cost efficiency albeit at a decreasing rate and decreases the percentage cost efficiency after it 
reaches a certain number of bidders. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
In this paper, we provide a positive equilibrium analysis for a two-dimensional 
public procurement auction with corruption, when the type space is two-dimensional in 
cost and quality, independently distributed. First, we show the case without corruption in 
an  N-bidder auction. We discuss the efficiency of this auction, comparative static 
analysis, and the convergence results as the number of bidders increase. This paper 
contributes to the literatures on auctions and corruption by introducing incompleteness 
of information in auctions with two-dimensional-type bidders and extending a 
two-bidder auction into an N-bidder auction. With corruption, we analyze the 
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Guerdjikova, David Easley, Peter Cramton, Iwan J. Azis, Christopher Cotton, Dino Gerardi, Walter Isard, 
Nancy Brooks, Marcela Gonzales-Rivas, Tom Pepinsky, Françoise Vermeylen, everybody who helped in 
conducting the empirical study (CSIS, BAPPENAS, DPU in Jakarta), participants at TWIPS (Cornell 
University, February 4, 2008), AEM Discussion Group (Cornell University, March 26, 2008), RS Discussion 
Group (Cornell University, April 11, 2008), RES Fourth Ph.D. Dissertation (London, January 17, 2009).
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equilibrium bidding and bribing strategies in an incomplete information setting with a 
finite type space and an infinite strategy space. 
The second section of this paper discusses the incentive mechanism design for an 
unobservable and non-contractible quality. We discuss the impossibility result and 
“constrained efficiency” (Dasgupta and Maskin, 2000; Jehiel and Moldovanu, 2001; 
Maskin, 1992) on this multidimensional-type-bidder model. The third section of this 
paper shows empirical evidence of the effect of number of bidders on the percentage 
cost efficiency of the auctions. We took 1,404 Semi Electronic public procurement 
auctions from Indonesia’s Department of Public Work in 2006, and we showed a 
quadratic relationship between the number of bidders and the percentage cost efficiency, 
which suggests that increasing the number of bidders increases the percentage cost 
efficiency at a decreasing rate and it starts to decrease the percentage cost efficiency 
after some number of bidders. The gap between the theoretical predictions and the 
empirical study may be due to factors, other than the competition effect, such as 
inefficiency of selection process with a very large number of bidders, that are not 
captured in the theoretical model. 
 
 
2.  LITERATURE  REVIEW 
 
Literature on corruption in first-price, sealed-bid public procurement auctions that is 
closest to our model is by Burguet and Che (2004). In our model, we study the N-bidder 
case while in their model there are only two bidders. Also, we study the incompleteness 
of information model, while in their model information is complete. Unlike the 
multidimensional type of the bidders in cost and quality in this paper, most of the 
literatures on auctions and corruption only study auctions in the presence of corruption 
with one-dimensional-type bidders (see Burguet and Perry, 2007; Lengwiler and 
Wolfstetter, 2005; Arozamena and Weinschelbaum, 2005; Meneza and Monteiro, 2006; 
Esõ and Schummer, 2004). 
Asker and Cantillon (2008) analyze the equilibrium of a scoring auction without 
corruption when the type space is multidimensional. In our paper, we also use the 
concept of “pseudotype” as it is used in Asker and Cantillon for auctions without the 
presence of corruption. This study gives a result in the case of a multidimensional type 
space that parallels the equilibrium result in Che (1993). The general existence of 
equilibrium result for an incomplete information game is given in Athey (2001, 1997). 
We will use the definition of efficiency by Dasgupta and Maskin (2000). Dasgupta and 
Maskin (2000), Jehiel and Moldovanu (2001), and Maskin (1992) introduce what is 
called “constrained efficiency” in the case of multidimensional-common values problem. 
We show in this paper that with non-contractible quality an auction is constrained 
efficient in which cost is minimized but quality is chosen randomly. 
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3.    THE MODEL WITHOUT CORRUPTION 
 
Each bidder i has a type that is private information:
2 0) , ( + ℜ ∈ i i c q , where  i q  is the 
quality and 
0
i c  is the initial cost. We first assume that  = = ) ( ) (
0
i i c F q F Uniform [0,1] 
and later, generalize. In this model, we will specifically focus on what is called the 
scoring auction. In this auction, each bidder is evaluated by a score that is a combination 
of the quality and the bid. An example of the score in a procurement auction is a linear 
combination of the quality and the bid. In this model, the central planner uses a scoring 
rule we denote by  i i i c q s − = , where  i c  is the bid. Let  ) ( ) (
0
i i i i i s s p c c u − ≥ − = . The 
strategy of each bidder is a mapping from his or her type in a two-dimensional real 
number to his or her bid in a one-dimensional real number:  + + ℜ → ℜ
2 . We denote 
) ( i v F   as the cumulative distribution function of  i v , where  i v   is the quality minus the 
cost, and  i s ~   as a deviation from the scoring rule at the equilibrium,  i s . 
Proposition 1 gives an explicit equilibrium bidding function in the case of a 
two-dimensional auction with two symmetric bidders and two-dimensional type of cost 
and quality. We use a substitution method in our proof. We could also use the method of 
a change variable used by Che (1993) that produces the same result. 
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Proofs of Propositions 1 to 8 and of Corollaries 1 to 3 are available upon request. 
 
























Example 1.   = = ) ( ) (
0
i i q F c F Uniform [0,1]. 
For  = = ) ( ) (
0
i i c F q F Uniform [0,1],  ) ( i v F   is given by: 
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c c v c , for  1 0 ≤ < v . 
 
Note for  1 − = i v , the second term of  ) , (
0
i i c v c  requires an application of the 
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Proposition 2.  Without corruption, the equilibrium bid increases in quality in the 
game with  = = ) ( ) (
0
i i c F q F Uniform [0,1]. 
Proposition 2 states that without corruption, in the game with uniform [0,1] 
distributions the equilibrium bid increases with the quality. 
 
Proposition 3.    Without corruption, the bid increases with the bidder’s cost. 
 
Proposition 4.  Without corruption, the probability of the bidder winning depends 
positively on the bidder’s quality. 
 
Proposition 5.  Without corruption, the probability of the bidder winning depends 
negatively on the bidder’s cost. 
Proposition 1, 3, 4, 5 and Corollary 1 generalize to any Probability Distribution 
Functions of  i q  and 
0
i c :  ) ( i q F ,  ) (
0
i c F . 
 
Corollary 2.  (N-Symmetric Player Game) Without corruption, the equilibrium 
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Corollary 3.  Without corruption, the equilibrium bidding strategy in the N-symmetric 
player game decreases in N and converges to the true cost.     
 
Example 2.  For  = = ) ( ) (
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Table 1.    Example 2: Bids Weakly Decrease in N 
) , /(
0
i i q c N   (0,0) (0,1) (1,0) (1,1) 
2 0.333  1.167  1  1.333 
4 0.143  0.650  1  1.143 
5 0.111  0.576  1  1.111 
10 0.053  0.401  1  1.053 
20 0.026  0.282  1  1.025 
50 0.010  0.177  1  1.010 
Notes: That at  ) 1 , 0 ( 1 0 = = − = i i i q c v , the bid remains at 1. At  1 − = i v , the second term of the  i c  
function is zero after we apply L’Hopital’s rule. Moreover, we notice that as N increases the bids converge 
downwards to the true cost. 
 
 
4.    THE MODEL WITH CORRUPTION 
 
There are N+2 players in this game: the central planner, the public official, and the N 
bidders. The central planner is a non-strategic, virtual, dummy, or passive player and 
chooses the winning bidder based on reported quality bids and cost bids. The central 
planner may represent a government whose utility reflects the social welfare that is the 
quality minus the cost of the project. We also assume that the public official is a 
non-strategic player whose moves are determined by nature and whose decision-making 
process is based on pair-wise comparison as explained below. The strategies of the 
non-strategic central planner and the non-strategic public official are consistent with the 
dominant strategies of a strategic central planner and a strategic public official.     
The main purpose of treating the central planner and the public officials as 
non-strategic players is because it simplifies the N+2-player game into an N-player game 
enabling us to focus on the strategic behaviors of the bidder. Treating the central planner 
and the public official as non-strategic players does not change how the central planner 
and the public official move because a strategic central planner and a strategic public 
official have dominant strategies, and we assume that non-strategic central planner and 
the non-strategic public official will play these dominant strategies. The only difference 
between this model and the model with a strategic public official and a strategic central 
planner is that in the case of a tie in which a strategic central planner and a strategic 
public official are indifferent among a set of actions, bidders may have subjective beliefs 
about what actions are chosen by the central planner and the public official that do not 
have to coincide with the actual moves.
1  This is called the subjective belief model. 
 
1 We may think a horse race as an example of the subjective belief model in which bettors have subjective 
beliefs about which horse is going to win. CORRUPTION IN PUBLIC PROCUREMENT AUCTIONS  41 
In the case of discrete payoffs, which is often the case in real life, tie-breaking rule is 
not trivial. We introduce the subjective belief model to tackle the tie-breaking issue. In 
this subjective belief model, bidders have subjective beliefs about what is going to 
happen in the case of a tie, i.e., who is going to win. Since the beliefs of the bidders are 
subjective, they can be different. Moreover, these beliefs do not have to coincide with 
the actual strategies of the central planner and the public official, who are assumed to be 
non-strategic players or “dummy” players. In other words, the beliefs of the bidders are 
non-equilibrium beliefs. 
The non-equilibrium beliefs are justified by assuming that the non-bidders whose 
strategies constitute the bidders' subjective beliefs are non-strategic players or “dummy” 
players. This is motivated by the uncertainty of the bidders about the non-bidders’ 
strategies given the weak institutions that are very common in developing countries. 
Central planner’s decisions and public official’s actions are often best described as 
accidental rather than strategic, which can hardly form any common objective beliefs 
among observers. Hence, this is what motivates the adoption of subjective belief model 
and the adoption of non-equilibrium behaviors for the non-bidders by excluding them 
from the game.
2 
The actual tie-breaking rule of the central planner and the public official is unknown. 
However, the bidders have subjective beliefs of what it might be. Uncertainty of the 
bidders about the moves of the non-bidders is often experienced in real life particularly 
in a public procurement setting where the central planner or the public official act 
seemingly erratically, probably because of political, social, monetary and other biases, or 
where there is a lack of evidence, observation, or experience to form a common 
objective belief a priori. Even when there are a few observations, it may not be possible 
for the bidders to guess the probability of a mixed strategy played by the central planner 
and the public official. 
We start this section by stating an example with a strategic public official and a 
strategic central planner as a benchmark to the model with a non-strategic public official 
and a non-strategic central planner. In both models, the equilibrium bids and bribes do 
show similar strategic behaviors of the bidders with respect to their types. 
 
4.1.  Bidder 
 
Each bidder i has a type denoted by  i t  that is two-dimensional in  i q  and 
0
i c , 
where  i q   is the quality and 
0
i c   is the initial cost. The strategy of bidder i is denoted by 
i s   that is a two-tuple strategy in  i c  and  i f , where  i c   is the bid and  i f   is the bribe. 
There are N player that is  } ,..., 1 { N I = , and i denotes an individual player. Denote 
m
i q  
 
2  Non-equilibrium belief model has been adopted by Costa-Gomes and Zauner (2003), other non- 
equilibrium model is the level-k model that has been used by Crawford and Iriberri (2007). MARIA MONICA WIHARDJA  42 
as the post-manipulated quality that is the quality that the public official reports to the 
central planner, and 
m
i s  as the post-manipulated scoring rule that is equal to the 
post-manipulated quality minus the bid. The two-bidder model can be represented in the 
following game as follows: 
 
m
i i i i i q f c u f c s I N , , ( { , )} , ( { }, 2 , 1 { { ) 2 ( } 2 , 1 { ∈ ∀ = = = = Γ ｜ } 2 , 1 {
0 ))} , ( ∈ ∀i i i q c , 
} ))} ( ), ( {( , )} , ( { } 2 , 1 {
0
} 2 , 1 {
0
∈ ∀ ∈ ∀ = i i i i i i i q F c F q c t , 
 
where, bidders are symmetric; 
 
i i T t ∈ , where  i T   is the type space of bidder i; 
2 : ℜ → i i T s , where T is the type space of bidder i; 
 
m q f c u , , ( ｜ : )) , (
0
i i q c  


















i c q c q p − − − ≥ − + ( ｜ . 2 , 1 ), ( ) = ∀ > > − − i f f p f f i i i i  
Note that bribes are contingent on the bidders winning and the quality report 
m q  is 
the strategy of the public official that is a function of bribes. 
 
4.2.  Public  Official 
 
The utility function of the public official, A, is given by:  2 2 1 1 p f p f uA + = , where 
i p  is the probability of bidder i winning. The strategy of the public official is a 
mapping from bribes offered to quality reports, that can be written by: 
2 2 : ℜ → ℜ
m q . 
 
4.3.  Central  Planner 
 
The utility function of the central planner, P, is given by:  2 2 2 1 1 1 ) ( ) ( p c q p c q uP − + − = , 
1 2 1 p p − = . The strategy of the central planner is to choose a winning bidder given the 
quality report and the cost bids by choosing a bidder with the highest score, 
m
i s . The 
strategy of the central planner can be written as:  ℜ → ℜ
4
1 : p . Note, that even though 
the central planner only gets the manipulated quality reports, the central planner cares 
about the true quality. Suppose in this model that the central planner is unaware of the 
bribery that takes place. 
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4.4.  Time  Line 
 
The sequence of the game is as follows. At time 0, nature chooses the types of 
bidders, } , {
0 q c , and the types of bidders are privately observed by all bidders. The 
central planner does not observe the cost nor quality of the bidders. The central planner 
only observes the quality but not the cost. At time 1, the bid,  i c , is submitted to the 
central planner and (contingent) bribe,  i f , is offered to the public official 
simultaneously and privately by each bidder. At time 2, the public official observes 
} , { 2 1 q q q =  and reports  )} , ( ), , ( { 2 1 2 2 1 1 f f q f f q q
m m m =  that is not necessarily equal to q 
to the central planner without any information about c. At time 3, the central planner 




i c q s − = , and chooses the winning bidder i, 
i ｜ } , { 2 1
m m m
i s s Max s = . 
The immediate properties that can be derived from the utility functions of the bidders, 
public official, and central planner are the following. 
 
Lemma 1.  (Type-Relevant Strategy) Since the utility of the bidders is non-trivially 
dependent on 
0
i c   and is trivially dependent on  i q , then the only incompleteness of the 
payoff-relevant information is 
0
i c  and the equilibrium strategy will be only non-trivially 
dependent on 
0
i c . 
 
Proofs of Lemmas 1 to 3 are available upon request. 
 
Lemma 1 says that since the utility of the bidder is only 
0
i c -dependent, i.e., the 
incompleteness of payoff-relevant information comes only from one element of the 
bidder’s type, 
0
i c , and  i q   does not affect the utility of the bidder, then the equilibrium 
strategy of the bidders will also be only dependent on 
0
i c  alone.  
 
Proposition 6.  (Efficiency-the Impossibility Result) An auction with the 
two-dimensional bid and two-dimensional type space with corruption cannot be efficient. 
 
 
5.  SUBJECTIVE  BELIEFS  MODEL 
 
In this section, we simplify the model by assuming the following two conditions: (1) 
the public official is a non-strategic or dummy player whose moves are determined by 
nature and are consistent with the dominant strategy of a strategic public official; the 
central planner is a non-strategic or dummy player whose moves are determined by 
nature and are consistent with the dominant strategy of a strategic player; (2) in an MARIA MONICA WIHARDJA  44 
N-player game, the nonstrategic public official moves according to a pair-wise 
comparison instead of a group-wise comparison as we will explain further below. Since 
both the public official and the central planner are dummy players, we allow the beliefs 
of the bidders on how the public official and the central planner move in the case of 
indifferences over possible actions to be subjective. In other words, the bidders do not 
have to correctly predict the moves of the public official and the central planner at the 
equilibrium. The actual moves of the public official and the central planner may 
therefore be inconsistent with the bidders’ subjective beliefs. Condition one therefore 
allows us to assume that bidders’ beliefs about the move of the public official and the 
central planner in the case of a tie of bribes and scores in which the public official and 
the central planner are indifferent over actions to take to be subjective beliefs instead of 
the objective beliefs. Subjective beliefs are common knowledge. We consider two 
examples where bidders behave differently under uncertainty. One is an example in 
which both bidders make decisions based on the best possible scenario over a set of 
probabilities. In this example, each bidder of the two or N bidders believes that in the 
case of a tie of bribe and scores, he/she will be favored by the public official and the 
central planner with probability one. Second is an example of the opposite case in which 
bidders make decisions over a set of actions based on the worst possible scenario they 
can possibly get over a set of probabilities.
3  In this example, each bidder believes that in 
the case of a tie of bribes and scores, the other bidder will be favored by the public 
official and the central planner with probability one.
4 We take these two extreme cases 
to make sure that solutions exist at the extreme cases, and if they do then solutions are 
also likely to exist in the intermediate cases.   
Condition two allows us to simplify our calculation on the powers and combinations of 
the probabilities of the bidders winning in the case of an N-bidder auction. The 
difference between pair-wise and group-wise is essentially this: evaluating the probability 
of winning of a bidder i over bidder j, group-wise comparison takes into account the 
values (or parameters of interest) of all other bidders, while pair-wise comparison only 
takes into account the values (or parameters of interest) of bidder i and j. 
The following Lemma will give a formal proof of how a strategic corrupt public 
official whose utility is only the bribe he/she receives will behave. This strategy of a 
strategic public official will underlie our assumption of how a non-strategic public 
 
3 This is what is also called the Maxmin decision rule (Gilboa and Schmeidler, 1989; Knight, 1921; 
Bewley, 1986). 
4 To axiomatize the different subjective beliefs of the bidders and represent it in a utility-functional form, 
we may use Chateauneuf, Eichberger, and Grant (2007) (CEG). These neo-additive beliefs can be represented 
by the multiple priors form. The notion of Nash Equilibrium in the model under uncertainty aversion is 
weaker since perfect consistency between beliefs and the actual plays fails. However, in our examples, since 
uncertainty is over the strategies of a fictitious player (i.e., the public official or the central planner) and not 
over the other strategic bidders' strategies, we do not need to check for these inconsistencies. CORRUPTION IN PUBLIC PROCUREMENT AUCTIONS  45 
official is expected to move. 
 
Lemma 2.  (Dominant Strategy of A Strategic Public Official) Suppose a public 
official has a utility function as follows:  ∑ ∈ = k k I k A p f u , where 
1
+ ℜ ∈ i f , 1 0 ≤ ≤ i p , 
and  ∑ = = 1 1 i
N
i p . Then, the solution to the maximization problem of the public official, 
A p u
I i i ∈ } { max , s.t. 
1
+ ℜ ∈ i f ,  1 0 ≤ ≤ i p , and ∑ = = 1 1 i
N
i p , is given by the following: 
0 ] max [ = − ∈ k I k i i f f p ,  I i∈ ∀ . 
 
Note that by “dominant strategy” here, we mean that regardless of what the bidders’ 
bribes are, a strategic public official will always play the above class of strategies. These 
strategies themselves among this class of strategies are not unique (in the case of a tie, 
the public official is indifferent among a set of mixed strategies). Hence, the above 
strategies are dominant only among classes of strategies but not among strategies. 
Similarly, the strategy that underlies the move of a non-strategic central planner is 
the dominant strategy of a strategic central planner, which is given by the following: 
 
Lemma 3.  (Dominant Strategy of a Strategic
5 Central Planner) Suppose a central 
planner has a utility function as follows:  2 2 2 1 1 1 ) ( ) ( p c q p c q up − + − = . Then, the solution 
to the maximization problem of the central planner,  p p p u
2 1, max , s.t.  1 , 0 2 ≤ ≤ p pi , is 




i i c q c q p ,  I i∈ ∀ . 
 
5.1.  Positive  Bidders 
 
We are going to assume that there are two types of bidders whom we are going to 
call the “positive” bidders and the “negative” bidders. Positive bidders makes decisions 
based on the best possible scenario while negative bidders makes decisions based on the 
worst possible scenario. The set of subjective beliefs of the bidders in a two-player game 
can be illustrated as follows 
 
= i r subjective belief of i on {1 wins, 2 loses} if  } { 2 2 1 c q c q
m
i
m − = − , ] 1 , 0 [ ∈ i r , 
= i o subjective belief of i on  } 0 , 1 { 2 1 = =
m m q q  if  } { 2 1 f f = , ] 1 , 0 [ ∈ i o . 
 
Note that the probability space of the prior beliefs of the bidders are the same that is 
 
5  “Strategic” here means maximizing social welfare,  i i c q − , without considering different types of 
auctions. The strategy space for a social planner is the probabilities of winning assigned to bidder 1 and 
bidder 2. MARIA MONICA WIHARDJA  46 
in the interval [0,1] for both  i r  and  i o . In the first example of positive bidders, we 
assume the following. 
 
Condition 1.    Positive Bidders (2- player and N-player games) 
1.    The public official is a non-strategic player or a dummy player. The uncertainty 
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f f if o y probabilit with






m , ] 1 , 0 [ ∈ i o ,  2 , 1 = i . 
 
The subjective probabilities of the bidders on the public official’s behavior are as 
follows: bidder 1’s subjective belief is  1 1 = o   and bidder 2’s subjective belief is  0 2 = o . 
2.  The central planner is a non-strategic player or dummy player. The uncertainty 
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where ] 1 , 0 [ ∈ i r ,  2 , 1 = i , ) , ( 2 1 π π π =  is the probability of bidder 1 and bidder 2 
winning respectively. Bidder 1’s subjective belief is  1 1 = r  and bidder 2’s subjective 
belief is  0 2 = r . 
3.  Probability of the bidders winning is based on pair-wise comparison and not 
group-wise comparison. The difference between a pair-wise comparison and a 
group-wise comparison can be illustrated by the following tables. 
Let for example, bribes are  ) 100 , 50 , 50 ( = f . Then, based on pair-wise comparison, 
the probabilities of the bidders winning given that bidder 1 and 2 offer the same bribe 
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Table 2.   Pair-wise  Comparison  
i\-i  1 2 3  i p  
1  1  ) 1 ( 1 2 1 − ≥ c c p ) 1 ( 1 3 1 + ≥ c c p ) 1 ( ) 1 ( 1 3 1 1 2 1 + ≥ − ≥ c c p c c p  
2  ) 1 ( 2 1 2 − ≥ c c p   1  ) 1 ( 2 3 2 + ≥ c c p ) 1 ( ) 1 ( 2 3 2 2 1 2 + ≥ − ≥ c c p c c p  
3  ) 1 ( 3 1 3 − ≥ c c p  ) 1 ( 3 2 3 − ≥ c c p 1  ) 1 ( ) 1 ( 3 2 3 3 1 3 − ≥ − ≥ c c p c c p  
 
 
Each cell represents the probability of winning of a row-bidder against one other 
column-bidder given only the bribes of these two bidders (pair-wise comparison). The 
probability of bidder 1 winning, for example, is the product of the cells of row 1, 




Table 3.   Group-wise  Comparison 
i\-i  1 2 3  i p  
1  1  ) ( 2 1 1 c c p ≤   ) 1 ( 1 3 1 + ≥ c c p ) 1 ( ) ( 1 3 1 2 1 1 + ≥ ≤ c c p c c p  
2  ) ( 1 2 2 c c p ≤   1  ) 1 ( 2 3 2 + ≥ c c p ) 1 ( ) ( 2 3 2 1 2 2 + ≥ ≤ c c p c c p  
3  ) 1 ( 3 1 3 − ≥ c c p  ) 1 ( 3 2 3 − ≥ c c p 1  ) 1 ( ) 1 ( 3 2 3 3 1 3 − ≥ − ≥ c c p c c p  
 
 
Note that the difference from the pair-wise comparison. Here, each cell represents 
the probability of winning of a row-bidder against one other column-bidder given the 
bribes of all of the bidders (group-wise comparison).   
These two conditions essentially allow the utility function of the bidders to be 
written as follows: 
 
1.  Two-player  game: 
 




i i i i i i i s s p f c c r o c − ≥ − − = , 




i f f p c c p f f p c c p s s p > + ≥ + ≥ − ≥ = ≥ − − − − − ,  2 , 1 = ∀i . 
 
2.  N-player game:   
 
m q f c u , , ( ｜








i i i i i i i i f f p c c p f c c r o c  
. ) ( ) 1 (
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f f p f f p c c p c c p
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N
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Note that the utility of the bidders now depend on the subjective beliefs,  ) , ( i i r o . Note 
that 
)! ( )! 1 (













 is the formula for a combination without replacement 
when order is not important. 
The general structure of the game with positive bidders in which Condition 1 above 
holds given Lemma 1 can be written as follows: 
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Example 3.  Discrete Type Space and Infinite Strategy Space with N players 
(Multiplicity of Equilibria) 
 
Let:  N i ,..., 2 , 1 = , and  I i∈ ∀ . 
Type space:  } 1 , 0 {




0 = i c p . 
Strategy and Strategy space: 
0 } 1 , 0 { : ) , ( + ℜ → i i f c . 
i i i i i i i
m p f c c r o c q f c u ) ( ) , , , , (
0 0 − − = , where 
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Equilibrium strategy profile:  1 ) 0 ( ) 1 (
0 0 − = = = i i c c c c , ) 1 ( ) 0 (
0 0 = > = i i c f c f . 
There exists a multiplicity of equilibria. The following table shows the equilibrium 
bids and bribes that maximize the sum of the expected utilities of the bidders (Pareto 
Dominant equilibrium bids and bribes) as N increases (numbers are rounded up to 5 d.p.). CORRUPTION IN PUBLIC PROCUREMENT AUCTIONS  49 
(Available upon request). 
Example 3 shows that the equilibrium bid converges downward as N increases. This 
example predicts the size of the corruption and efficiency of an N-bidder auction. As N 
gets very large, the low-cost bidder offers a bribe of one and the high-cost bidder offers 
a bribe of zero. Hence, only for the high-cost bidder does the equilibrium bribe 
converges to zero, while for the low-cost bidder, the equilibrium bribe converges to a 
positive number. The low-cost bidder bids two and the high-cost bidder bids one. Hence, 
only for the high-cost bidder does the equilibrium bid converges to the true cost, while 
for the low-cost bidder, the equilibrium bid does not converge to the true cost. Note that 
in Example 3, the probabilities of the high- and low-cost bidders win are equal. We can 
also show that the higher the probability of  0
0 = i c   is, the higher the number of bidders, 
N, needed for the bids and the bribes to converge. 
 
 
Table 4.    Example 3: Pareto Dominant Equilibrium Bids and Bribes   
N  c(
0
i c =0)  c(
0
i c =1)  f(
0
i c =0) f(
0
i c =1) u(c,f, m q ｜ 0
i c =0) u(c,f, m q ｜ 0
i c =1) 
2 6  5  2  0  4  3 
3 4.28571 3.28571  2  0  2.28571  1.28571 
4 3.72973 2.72973  2  0  1.72973  0.72973 
5 3.46286 2.46286  2  0  1.46286  0.45202 
6 3.31114 2.31114  2  0  1.31114  0.31114 
7 3.21651 2.21651  2  0  1.21651  0.21651 
8 3.15405 2.15405  2  0  1.15405  0.15405 
9 3.11125 2.11125  2  0  1.11125  0.11125 
10 3.08118  2.08118  2  0  1.08118  0.08118 
20 3.00428  2.00425  2  0  1.00425  0.00425 
30 3.00024  2.00024  2  0  1.00024  0.00024 
40 3.00001  2.00001  2  0  1.00010  0.00013 
50 3  2  2  0  1  Pi 
75 3  2  2  0  1  Pi 
76 2  1  1  0  1  0 
100  2 1  1  0  1  0 
1000  2 1  1  0  1  0 
 
 
5.2.  Negative  Bidders 
 
Otherwise stated, the structure of the game is the same as of Example above 
(positive bidders). Let 
2
1
) 1 ( ) 0 (
0 0 = = = = i i c p c p . Given these conditions, the utility of 
the negative bidders can be written as follows: MARIA MONICA WIHARDJA  50 
f c u , ( ｜ ) ( ) 1 ( )( ( ) , ,
0 0
i i i i i i i i i i f f p c c p f c c r o c − − > − > − − =  
. 2 , 1 ), ( ) 1 ( = ∀ ≤ + > + − − i f f p c c p i i i i  
 
In words, each bidder believes that in the case of a tie of bribes, the other bidder will 
get the highest possible quality of one and he/she will get a quality of zero. In the case of 
a tie of scores, each bidder believes that the other bidder will win with probability one. 
Now, suppose we put an upper bound on the bidders’ bid that is  1 max
0
} 1 , 0 {
0 = ≤ = i c i c c
i . 
The following strategy is an equilibrium:  1 ) 0 (
0 → = i c c , 1 ) 0 ( ) 1 (
0 0 − = = = i i c c c c , 
999999998 . 0 ) 0 (
0 → = i c f , 999999997 . 0 ) 1 (
0 → = i c f . At the equilibrium, 
0 ) 0 (










i c p , and  0 ) 1 (
0 = = i c u  ) 0 ) 1 ( (
0 = = i c p . This example 
suggests that negative bidders will be indifferent between entering the auction and not 
entering the auction. In other words, uncertainty over the moves of the public official 
and the central planner in the case of a tie of bribes and scores may deter bidders to enter 
the auction. Similar to Myerson’s argument on subjective beliefs or inconsistency of 
beliefs among players (Myerson, 1991, p.251), in the model with a non-strategic public 
official, the bidders could enter the auction having an expected utility that is higher than 
it truly is (see the positive-bidders case above) or the bidders could opt not to enter the 





Proposition 7.  In an N-positive-bidder auction game with corruption above in 
which the type space is discrete, the strategy space is infinite, the central planner and the 
public official are non-strategic players and bidders’ beliefs on the moves of the central 
planner and the public official are subjective beliefs, there exist multiple equilibria with 
respect to the bidders’ subjective beliefs of the following form:  1 ) 1 ( ) 0 (
0 0 + = = = i i c c c c , 
) 1 ( ) 0 (
0 0 = > = i i c f c f , } 2 , 1 { = ∀i . At these equilibria:   
* * * * ,
0
,








r o c f c u
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, } 1 , 0 {
0 = ∀ i c , } 2 , 1 { = ∀i .   
 
Proposition 8.  In a two-negative-bidder auction game with corruption above in 
which  1 . max
0
} 1 , 0 {
0 = ≤
= i c i c c
i , the type space is discrete, the strategy space  ) , ( i i f c  is  in 
1 ] 1 , 0 [ + ℜ × , the central planner and the public official are non-strategic players and 
bidders’ beliefs on the moves of the central planner and the public official are subjective 
beliefs, there exists an equilibrium in pure strategy with respect to the bidders’ subjective CORRUPTION IN PUBLIC PROCUREMENT AUCTIONS  51 
beliefs of the following form:  1 ) 1 ( ) 0 (
0 0 + = = = i i c c c c , ) 1 ( ) 0 (
0 0 = > = i i c f c f ,} 2 , 1 { = ∀i . 
At this equilibrium: 
* * * * ,
0
,








r o c f c u
c






, } 1 , 0 {
0 = ∀ i c , } 2 , 1 { = ∀i . 
 
One could extend the scope of this paper by taking bidders with different attitudes 
towards uncertainties, for example, both bidders believe that they win with probability 
one-half, one-half, or one bidder has an optimistic belief while the other has a 
pessimistic belief, and analyze how the existence of an equilibrium and an equilibrium 
strategy will change. 
The more important issue here is not about a specific tie-breaking rule, but about the 
bidders’ beliefs that are at the extreme opposites, i.e., both bidders think that they are 
going to win (lose) in the case of optimistic (pessimistic) beliefs. In the long run, both 
players will observe the same events and their beliefs will eventually converge. Further 
study, such as dynamic auction, is needed to resolve this issue. 
 
HOW MUCH EFFICIENCY IS LOST? 
 
Note that the probability of the bidder winning is not a function of the true quality of 
the bidders, and hence, the probability of the bidder winning in terms of quality is a 
perfect randomization. This is what is called “constrained efficiency” (Dasgupta and 
Maskin, 2000). In other words, what an auctioneer or a central planner can best hope for 
is cost minimization and but not full efficiency. 
The distributions of type are not the same in the models with and without corruption, 
however, we can still predict that the presence of corruption increases bids by the 
following argument. In the model without a corruption, regardless of quality, the bid 
converges to the true cost that is 0 for  0
0 = i c  and  1  for  1
0 = i c , while in the model with 
a corruption, the bid never converges to the true cost for  0
0 = i c  even though it does 
converge to the true cost for  1
0 = i c . Notice, however, that the equilibrium bribe is 
positive only for  0
0 = i c , while no bribe is offered by the high-cost bidder. Hence, this 
suggests the mark-up in the case of the low-cost bidder can be blamed partly on bribes. 
 
 
6.    INCENTIVE MECHANISM DESIGNS: A GLIMPSE 
 
Our attempt in this paper is to design an efficient incentive mechanism design in a 
procurement auction model when bidders’ private information are multidimensional. We 
restrict to unobservable and non-contractible quality. Non-contractible quality means 
that either qualities are ex-post non-verifiable or ex-post verifiable but there is no legal MARIA MONICA WIHARDJA  52 
enforcement to punish corrupt bidders and/or public officials. In some cases, this 
assumption is more realistic than earlier literatures that assume contractible qualities for 
a couple of reasons. One is that qualities of the bidders are most of the time not directly 
observable and ex-post are not perfectly verifiable. Second, we may also assume that the 
quality is not contractible even though it is ex-post verifiable because, in the worst 
possible case, legal enforcement is not effective and hence, corrupt bidders and/or public 
officials are never caught and bidders are not deterred to bribe the public officials. 
 
MODEL AND EXAMPLE 
 
We restrict the number of player to two, however, the results in this section still 
holds for N players. An individual player is denoted by  . 2 , 1 = i  The mechanism 
designer denoted by P is also the procurer and the social planner.
6 The social choice 
function is denoted by  ) (θ f   that is a function of the players’ types,  θ . Denote  ) (θ i y  
as the decision function for player i, where  1 ) ( = θ i y   if the procured good/service goes 
to player i, 0 ) ( = θ i y   otherwise. The monetary transfer to player i is denoted by  ) (θ i t . 
The function  ) ( i i y θ  denotes the marginal decision function for player i given  i θ  and 
all agents  i j ≠   reveal their types truthfully. Similarly, the function  ) ( i i t θ  denoted  the 
marginal transfer payment function to player i given  i θ  and agents  i j ≠  reveal their 
types truthfully. The mechanism  Γ implements that the social choice function  ) (θ f  
is there is an equilibrium strategy profile 
* s  such that  ) ( )) ( (
* θ θ f s g = , where 
)) ( ( θ s g  is the outcome function given  ) (θ s . The strategy set of each player i is 
denoted by  i S . 
Otherwise stated, let the social choice function be: 
 
X x t t y y f → Θ Θ = 2 1 2 1 2 1 : )] ( ), ( ); ( ), ( [ ) ( θ θ θ θ θ , 
p
i











2 , 1 2 1 , , } 0 )) , max( )( ( : ) ( { θ θ , 
 
where  = X the set of alternatives,  ) , (
0
i i i c q = θ , ) , ( 2 1 θ θ θ = ,  2 1 Θ Θ ∈ x θ ,  = Θi  
common knowledge,  = ) ( i F θ Uniform
2 ] 1 , 0 [,   i i Θ ∈ ∀θ . 
Define a direct mechanism:  )) ( , , ( 2 1 s g S S = Γ ,  i i S Θ ∈ ,  2 1 S S S s × = ∈  and  Γ 
 
6 Without a loss of generality, we can also assume that the mechanism designer who is also the procurer 
and the social planner is a player. The set-up of the model will be slightly different although it will not 
change the theoretical results.   CORRUPTION IN PUBLIC PROCUREMENT AUCTIONS  53 
implements ) (θ f  if:  ) ( ) (
* θ θ f s g = = , or  ) ), ,
~
( ( ) ), ( ( i i i i i i f u f u θ θ θ θ θ − ≥ ,  i i Θ ∈ ∀θ
~
, 
2 , 1 = ∀i . 
 
Example 4.  Two-Dimensional  Private  Information   
Let  i i i s i i i i i i i i p v y U Max t c y u t q y u ) ˆ ( . ; ) ˆ ( ) ˆ ( ); ) ˆ ( ( 2 , 1
0
2 , 1 θ θ θ θ θ ∑ ∑ = = = + − = − = , where 
∑ = + = θ ˆ ( [ 2 , 1 u u U i p s ｜ )] i θ . 




In fact, we can put the claim above more formally by the following Theorem. 
Theorem 1.  Define a Social Choice Function,  )) ( ), ( ( ) ( θ θ θ y t f = , whose objective 
function is  0 )) ( max ) )(( (
0
2 , 1
0 = − − = k k k i i i c q c q y θ ,  ∑ =1 ) (θ i i y , ] 1 , 0 [ ) ( ∈ θ i y ,  2 , 1 = ∀i . 
The utilities of the procurer and the bidders are the following:   




i i i i s i i i i c q y U t c y − = + − = ∑ = θ θ θ θ , then 
there cannot be an efficient mechanism that implements  ) (θ f . 
Proofs are available upon request. 
 
This theorem comes directly from the Jehiel and Moldovanu’s impossibility result 
theorem (Jehiel and Moldovanu, 2001), which is also proven in Dasgupta and Maskin 
(2000) and Maskin (1992), that states that there is no efficient mechanism when there is 
at least one player (the bidders) whose private information (their qualities) affects the 
choice of the most efficient bidder but does not directly affect the owner(s) of that 
information (the bidders). 
 
 
7.    EMPIRICAL STUDY: INEFFICIENCY WITH HIGH NUMBERS OF BIDDERS 
 
We examine a case study on Land Management and Policy Development Project 
from BAPPENAS (Indonesia’s National Development Planning Agency) in 2006 and 
we perform empirical study on 1,404 auctions conducted by Indonesia’s Department of 
Public Work in 2006.
7 In the theoretical section above, it is argued that increasing the 
number of bidders increases competition, i.e., bidders bid less (and they bribe less). 
Hence, the appropriate empirical approach is to test whether the percentage cost 
efficiency of the auction (which means how much lower bidders bid relative to the 
original budget allocated to the auction) is positively correlated to the number of bidders.   
 
7 This section is taken from Wihardja (2007). MARIA MONICA WIHARDJA  54 
In the empirical study, we run a fixed-effects regression to test this. 
Auctions’ subjects, i.e., the pools of bidders, are not identical. The fixed-effect 
regression is conducted by controlling for all variables that are not identical, except for 
the numbers of bidders, that might give rise to different pools of bidders. The controlling 
variables in this fixed-effect model include the state department that conducts the 
auction, the province where the auction is conducted, the type of auction (or the object 
being auctioned), the initial budget of the auction (or the value of the auction), and the 
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I(.): Indicator variable, 
ln(% Cost Efficiency): 
Natural Log of the percentage cost efficiency ln = (((Initial Budget-Contract 
Price)/Initial Budget) % 100 × ), 
) ( n n− : Centered Number of Bidders= Number of bidders-Mean of number of bidders, 
2 ) ( n n− : Centered Number of Bidders Squared= (Number of bidders - Mean of 
number of bidders)
2, 
Satkal: Department, Prov: Province, Category: Type of auctions, Value: Initial 
Budget, Metode: Method of the Auctions. 
The following table is the result of the regression (Available upon request for the 
complete regression result): 
 
 
Table 5.  Regression  Coefficients 
Regression Coefficient  t-value  t P >  
b  0.0098179 5.74  0 
c  -0.0000882 -6.93  0 
Number of Observations  1332     
F(46,1285) 11.95     
Prob> F 0     
R-Squared 0.2996     
Root MSE  0.8217     
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We transform the dependent variable into the natural logarithmic form to normalize 
the residuals and we center the independent variables in order to avoid multicollinearity 
between the number of bidders and the squared number of bidders. We drop one 
observation that has a very high residual (an outlier). We drop observations that use 
Direct Selections/Auctions
8 and Direct Appointment methods. Direct Selections/ 
Auctions methods are used for low values projects and hence observations that fall into 
Direct Selections/Auctions also fall into one of the dummy variables for “Value” (or 
initial budget). In order to avoid multicollinearity, we drop these observations. Direct 
Appointments directly appoints one bidder and hence, it could not capture the effect of 
the number of bidders on the percentage cost efficiency.   
The regression result suggests the concave relationship between the number of 
bidders and the natural log of the percentage cost efficiency. Both the linear and the 
quadratic coefficients are significant. The optimum point of the concave graph is at 149 
bidders. In other words, percentage cost efficiency starts to decline as the number of 
bidders increases at 149 bidders. The mean of the number of bidders in this study is 
37.97166. Although the theoretical model above captures the competition effect as the 
number of bidders increases, this empirical study suggests that increasing the number of 
bidders can have a negative effect for high numbers of bidders above 149 bidders. The 
factors that could negatively affect the percentage cost efficiency of the auctions with 
high numbers of bidders may include an inefficient selection process with too many 
bidders that may not be directly related to the competition effect. A theoretical model 
that could capture this effect and explaining the discrepancy between the theoretical 
predictions and the empirical study will be useful for future study. 
 
 
8.  CONCLUSION 
 
The main contribution of this paper is to show that the equilibrium bids and bribes in 
the presence of corruption with a discrete type space and an infinite strategy space 
decrease as the number of bidders increases. The analysis on the incentive mechanism 
design shows a disappointing result that when quality is not fully verifiable and quality 
is not contractible, there is no mechanism that is efficient. The second-best option is to 
minimize cost but to randomize the choice of quality. The empirical study on Semi 
E-Procurement from Indonesia’s Department of Public Work in 2006 suggests that 
increasing the number of bidders starts to give a negative effect of the percentage cost 
efficiency at a high number of bidders. A theoretical model that could capture the 
discrepancy between the theoretical model in this paper and the empirical study is 
needed. 
 
8 Public Selection and Direct Selection methods are used for consultant services while Public Auction and 
Direct Auction methods are used for construction and goods services.     MARIA MONICA WIHARDJA  56 
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